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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1250 
_____________ 
 
 
MARS HOME FOR YOUTH, 
                                                Petitioner 
v. 
 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
                                                                         Respondent 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIAL SERVICES UNION, LOCAL 668 OF  
THE SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
                                                                                                                   Intervenor 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1590 
_____________ 
 
 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
                                                                         Petitioner 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIAL SERVICES UNION, LOCAL 668 OF  
THE SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
                                                                                   Intervenor 
v. 
 
MARS HOME FOR YOUTH, 
                                                Respondent 
 
_____________ 
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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW AND CROSS-APPLICATION 
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a), 
October 5, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, GREENEBRG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  October 26, 2011) 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Mars Home for Youth filed a Petition for Review of a final decision and order of 
the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”).  The Board filed a Cross Application 
for Enforcement.  Mars Home seeks review of the Board’s determination that five 
Assistant Residential Program Mangers (“assistant managers”) were not “supervisors” 
under Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”), and thus were able 
to participate in a unionizing vote.  We reject Mar Home’s petition and grant the Board’s 
cross-application for enforcement. 
I. 
Because we write for the parties, we discuss only the facts relevant to our 
conclusion.  Mars Home for Youth is a facility that provides residential and other 
services to at-risk juveniles.  Each of the six residential units is staffed by a residential 
program manager (“program managers”), an assistant residential program manager, and 
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resident assistants (“assistants”).  The assistants report to the assistant managers who, in 
turn, report to the program manager.  
 The Pennsylvania Social Services Union Local 669 a/w Service Employees 
International Union a/w CTW (“Union”) filed a petition before the National Labor 
Relations Board seeking to represent the assistants and assistant managers as a collective 
bargaining unit.  Mars Home opposed the inclusion of the assistant managers on the basis 
that they were supervisors.  After a hearing, the Regional Director of the NLRB issued a 
decision finding that the five assistant managers were not supervisors and could be 
included in the collective bargaining unit.  Mars Home timely sought review of the 
decision, which was denied.   
 Union elections were held and the group voted 34-31 in favor of allowing the 
Union to represent them collectively.  The NLRB certified the Union as the exclusive 
collective-bargaining representative of the employees.  Mars Home refused to bargain, 
contending that the certification was invalid.  
 The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge and the NLRB issued a complaint 
against Mars Home alleging that its refusal to bargain violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of 
the National Labor Relations Act.  The Board found that Mars Home violated the Act and 
issued a cease and desist order.  Mars Home timely petitioned this Court and the Board 
cross-petitioned for an enforcement of its order.
1
  
II. 
                                              
1
  We exercise jurisdiction over the appeal of the Board’s decision pursuant to Sections 10(e) and (f) of the 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f).   
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 Our review of the National Labor Relations Board’s decisions is limited.  We 
“accept the Board’s factual determinations and reasonable inferences derived from 
factual determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence.” Citizens Publishing 
and Printing Co. v. NLRB, 263 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).  Substantial evidence is 
“more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Id.  We uphold the Board’s conclusions of 
fact “even if we would have made a contrary determination had the matter been before us 
de novo.”  Id.  The Board’s legal determinations are subject to plenary review, but “with 
due deference to the Board’s expertise in labor matters.” NLRB v. St. George Warehouse, 
Inc., 645 F.3d 666, 674 (3d Cir. 2011).  We uphold the Board’s interpretations of the Act 
if they are reasonable.  Citizens Publishing and Printing Co., 263 F.3d at 233.  We have 
cautioned that “determinations respecting supervisor status are particularly suited to the 
Board’s expertise.”  NLRB v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 532 (3d Cir. 1977). 
III. 
 To be entitled to the Act’s protections and includable in a bargaining unit, one 
must be an “employee” as defined by the Act  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2(3), 152(3); see also 
NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711 (2001).  The definition of 
“employee” does not include “supervisors.” See id. at § 152(3).  A supervisor is: 
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, 
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or 
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their 
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with 
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.  
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29 U.S.C. § 152(11).  Whether someone is a supervisor is a question of fact, and thus will 
be upheld if it supported by substantial evidence.  See W.C. McQuiade, Inc., 552 F.2d at 
532-33; NLRB v. Quinnipiac College, 256 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2001); Entergy Gulf 
States., Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2001). There is a three-part test for 
determining supervisory status.  Employees are supervisors if: “(1) they hold the 
authority to engage in any 1 of the 12 listed supervisory functions, (2) their exercise of 
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment, and (3) their authority is held in the interest of the employer.”  
Kentucky River, 532 U.S. at 713 (internal quotation marks omitted).  A supervisor 
exercises independent judgment when he acts or recommends action “free of the control 
of others and form[s] an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing data.”  In re 
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 692-93 (2006).  As the party asserting it, 
Mars Home bears the burden of establishing supervisory status.  Id. at 711-12.   
 Mars Home alleges that the assistant managers were supervisors under the Act 
because they responsibly directed the work of employees, assigned employees and had 
the authority to discipline them.  We disagree. 
A. 
 Mars Home contends that the Board erred when it found that it had not met its 
burden of producing sufficient evidence to establish that the assistant managers 
“responsibly direct” the assistant’s work.   
 The Board, held that for direction to be responsible, “the person directing and 
performing the oversight of the employee must be accountable for the performance of the 
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task by the other, such that some adverse consequence may befall the one providing the 
oversight if the tasks performed by the employee are not performed properly.”2 In re 
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 691-92 (2006).  The putative supervisor 
must be at risk of suffering adverse consequences for the actual performance of others, 
not his own performance in overseeing others.  Id. at 695.   
 The record before the Board contained numerous examples of where assistant 
managers were not disciplined for the failure of resident assistants to follow their 
directions.  Rather, the record shows that the assistant managers were disciplined for their 
own failings as managers.   
Mars Home argument that it implemented an evaluation system that encompassed 
the assistant manager’s responsible direction is similarly unavailing.  The change has yet 
to be implemented.  Further, the evaluation form, which will form the basis of these pay 
raises, does not evaluate the assistant managers on their responsible direction.  The only 
relevant category is “interpersonal relationships,” but Mars Home points to no evidence 
in the record that indicates how the program managers use this category, or any other, in 
evaluating the assistant managers’ directing others. 
Overall, the Board’s determination that Mars Home failed to met its burden of 
demonstrating that the assistant managers are supervisors because they responsibly direct 
others is supported by substantial evidence and should not be disturbed. 
B. 
                                              
2
  The term “responsibly to direct” is ambiguous.  NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 
579 (1994).  Thus the Board’s interpretation is entitled to deference so long as it is reasonable.  See Fei Mei Cheng 
v. Attorney General, 623 F.3d 175, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2010).  We find that the Board’s interpretation to be reasonable 
and thus entitled to deference. See e.g., Loparex LLC v. NLRB, 591 F.3d 540, 550 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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Mars Home further alleges that the assistant managers are supervisors under 
Section 2(11) because they possess the authority to assign assistants to various tasks.   
The Board has construed the term “assign” to “refer to the act of designating an 
employee to a place . . ., appointing an employee to a time, . . . or giving significant 
overall duties, i.e., tasks, to an employee.”3 Oakwood Health, 348 NLRB at 689.  A 
supervisor designates “significant overall duties to an employee” not simply “instructions 
that an employee perform a discrete task.”  Id.  A supervisor must have the power to 
require that these duties be undertaken.  Golden Crest, 348 NLRB at 729.  
As to scheduling, there is sufficient evidence in the record that only some assistant 
managers had the authority to recommend an assistant’s schedule, which was later 
reviewed and approved by the program manager, and they had no authority to require the 
assistant to follow certain schedules.  See Golden Crest, 348 NLRB at 729 (finding no 
authority to assign when only another held the power to mandate).  Further, the schedules 
are constrained by significant Government and Mars Home regulations, which cuts 
against finding that the assistant managers acted with independent judgment.   
Part of the assistant manager’s duties is to make sure that the resident halls are 
adequately staffed at all times.  If assistants are absent, an assistant manager may either 
let the unit run short-staffed, assuming it still has the required staff-to-resident ratio, pull 
an assistant from another unit, or find a volunteer.  When seeking volunteers, it is Mars 
Home’s informal policy that the assistant manager call the most junior assistant first and 
                                              
3
  Similarly to responsibly to direct, the phrase “assign” is ambiguous and thus the Board’s interpretation is 
upheld if it is reasonable.  We find that it is and thus is entitled to deference.  
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that no employee may work for more than 16 consecutive hours.  A program manager 
must approve any overtime.   
Also, there is sufficient evidence in the record that demonstrates the assistant 
managers do not have the authority to assign transportation duty to the assistants.  In fact, 
one assistant manager testified that when a resident needs to be transported he simply 
asks for volunteers and bases any staffing decisions on the gender of the patient.  
Finally, the Board’s interpretation that daily work schedules, such as assigning an 
assistant to monitor a single resident or to respond to a crisis constituted evidence of 
direction, not assignment, is not unreasonable.  The Board has interpreted assignment to 
mean the allocation of significant overall responsibilities to an employee, not ad hoc 
duties.  Oakwood Health, 348 NLRB at 689.  Here, it is plain that the assistant managers 
are giving only ad hoc duties and is not evidence of the authority to assign under the Act.  
Based on the above, the Board’s conclusion that the assistant managers lack the 
authority to assign under § 2(11) or did not use independent judgment is supported by 
substantial evidence and will not be overturned.    
IV. 
 We have considered Mars Home’s remaining claims and find them without 
merit.  Mars Home for Youth’s Petition for Review is DENIED.  The National Labor 
Relations Board’s Cross-Application for Enforcement of its Order is GRANTED.   
